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to compel the doctor to fulfill his moral duty to disclose all pertinent facts.77
Traditionally, this disclosure was not necessary until the requirements of res tpsa
had been established. But the Quntal doctrine forces the defendant doctor to
prove his freedom from negligence without the plaintiff establishing the tradi-
tional requirements. 78 This recent extension in medical malpractice cases will
have a detrimental effect on the practice of good medicine.79
The legitimate interests of the injured patient can be safeguarded without
distorting the doctrine of res zpsa. The plaintiff would encounter no serious prob-
lem in establishing the first requirement.80 Securing expert evidence to support
the general proposition that the injury is of a land that does not ordinarily occur
absent negligence would be an easier chore than obtaining expert testimony
establishing specific acts of negligence.8' Doctors would be more prone to re-
spond to questions regarding inferences which may be drawn from the nature of
the act itself than to testify that the defendant doctor did indeed deviate from
the standard of care in the community.
If the courts. continue to give res zpsa instructions without compelling the
plaintiff to establish the first requirement, the doctrine of res zpsa will become
an "open sesame resulting in a rule of absolute liability whenever injury follows
services of physicians and surgeons."82
Wendell J. Naraghi*
77 Louisell & Williams, supra note 2, at 255.
78 The same conclusion as to the effect of the Fowler case was drawn m Note, 38
So. CALIF. L. REv. 740, 744 (1965).
79 "To permit an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
solely because an uncommon complication develops would place too great a burden
upon the medical profession and might result in an undesirable limitation on the use of
operations or new procedures involving an inherent risk of injury even after due care is
used." Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 839, 372 P.2d 97, 99 (1962).
80 See note 9 supra.
81 Note, 60 Mica. L. REv. 1153 (1962).82 Clark v. Gibbons, 240 A.C.A. 776, 790, 50 Cal. Rptr. 127, 136 (1966).
* Member, Third Year Class.
RETALIATORY EVICTION-IS CALIFORNIA
LAGGING BEHIND?
In a city such as Washington D.C., where housing is scarce and one-sixth of
all dwellings are inadequate,' obtaining a place to live can be a difficult task. On
March 24, 1965, Yvonne Edwards ended her search for lodging by entering a
month to month tenancy agreement with Nathan Habib; shortly thereafter she
took possession of her newly rented home. Her elation soon subsided, as she
discovered the premises were in a condition below the numnum standards pre-
scribed by statutes and regulations governing housing in the District of Columbia.
I See San Francisco Examiner & Chromcle, Jan. 1, 1967, p. 13, col. 8.
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Desiring the benefits of a safe and sanitary dwelling, she notified the proper
authorities of the violations. They, in turn, notified her landlord of the repairs
and improvements that would have to be made. Nathan Habib promptly sought
to evict the complaining tenant.
In the District of Columbia were Habib brought Ins suit, the existing law
permitted a landlord to evict a tenant for any reason or no reason, in a summary
proceeding, after notice to quit had been given.2 Thus he had every reason to
believe he would succeed, and he was successful in the trial court by a default
]udgment.s Granted a rehearing, Edwards sought to show that the cause of her
eviction was retaliation, but the trial court refused to admit the evidence and
directed a verdict for the landlord. She appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia; in a per cunain decision the court held that
while rent must be paid, a defense of retaliation was admissible.4 Judge Wright,
in a concurring opinion, said that a person has a constitutional right to inform
the authorities of violations of the law, 5 and a court will not aid a landlord in Ins
attempt to deprive a tenant of this right: "A landlord may evict for any legal
reason or no reason. What he may not do is evict for an illegal purpose such as
pumshing the tenant for exercising her constitutional right to report law violations
on the premises to the proper authorities."6 This decision marks a major de-
parture7 from the well settled rules of landlord and tenant law.
2 D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-910 (1961) (summary possession statute); e.g., Rudder v.
United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (dictum).
8 A motion to set aside the default ]udgment was denied, and that refusal was ap-
pealed in Habib v. Edwards, Civil No. 75895-65, D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. LI. & Ten. Branch,
Oct. 28, 1965. Judge Harold M. Greene, in a memorandum decision, declared such an
eviction to be unconstitutional and granted a rehearing.4 Edwards v. Habib, 366 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per cunam) (Wright, J.,
concurring; Danaher, J., dissenting).
5 Judge Wright relies heavily upon United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir.
1961) where the court held that landlords could not evict or threaten to evict Negro
tenants for registering to vote.
0 366 F.2d at 629 n.3. Judge Wright relied upon In re Quarles and Butler, 158
U.S. 532 (1895) which holds that there is a constitutional right to inform the authori-
ties of a violation of a federal law. This right "does not depend upon any Amendments
to the Constitution, but arises out of the creation and establishment by the Constitution
itself of a national government, paramount and supreme within its sphere of action."
Id. at 536. It would seem that the reasoning of Quarles would also apply to the report
of a violation of any local law or ordinance, since such local regulation is inherent in
our governmental system. Furthermore, it appears feasible to assert that the fundamental
first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, might be a sound basis for finding a
constitutional right to report local law violations to the local authorities.
7 Tis is not the first time a court has commented on retaliatory eviction. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Union v. Boca Raton Club, Inc., 73 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1954). In
this case, a resort hotel mi an isolated area provided housing for employees. When the
employees struck, the employer evicted them. The court noted that a temporary re-
straining order should have been granted when the employees applied for it, as "the
employer's primary purpose was retaliatory. Certainly the employer could not have
been enjoined permanently from evicting striking employees from the premises, nor
should the temporary injunction have been one of long standing. But temporary relief
should have been granted " Id. at 872 (dictum).
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Background-The Common Law and Modern Society
Under the common law rule a tenant without a provision for duration in his
lease has no defense against an action for eviction by the landlord.8 A landlord
may demand possession of Ins premises for any reason or no reason, and a court
of competent jurisdiction will give hmn possession after reasonable notice has
been served.9 The tenant does have some recourse when the landlord is a wrong-
doer. Under the doctrine of constructive eviction, a tenant may move without
liability for rent when the landlord acts or neglects to act and the condition of
the premises so interferes with the tenant's enjoyment and possession as to force
him, acting as a reasonable man, to move from the premises.'9 The tenant must
vacate the premises to avail himself of the doctrine of constructive eviction."
Although the courts have tended to broaden the scope of the factors constituting
a constructive eviction,12 the tenant's problem of finding and renting a safe, sam-
tary home at a price he can afford has not been solved. The ability to move when
other housing in the same price range is scarce and substandard is no remedy13
The Habib decision clearly puts the tenant in a better position by allowing him
to seek enforcement of the building, health and safety codes without being
forced to move to another dwelling that nght be in worse condition.
At one time, the common law right of summary possession may have fulfilled
the needs of society. But American society constantly changes. A technological
revolution has taken place; Americans have more leisure time and more goods
than ever before. As the standard of living and housing increases, it would seem
that slums and substandard housing would become less of a problem. Such is not
the case. The trend toward urbanization has led to overcrowded cities. The 1960
census indicates that there were over 58 million housing units in the United
States in that year,14 and almost one-half of these were located in the standard
metropolitan areas; 15 of this one-half, almost twenty per cent of the dwellings
8 Without a provision for duration, a lessee has a tenancy at will or a periodic
tenancy. For a discussion of the applicable common law rules, see Angel v. Black Band
Consol. Coal Co., 96 WVa. 47, 122 S.E. 274 (1924).
9See Blum v. Robertson, 24 Cal. 127 (1864); Waring v. King, 8 Mees. & W 511,
151 Eng. Rep. 1166 (1841); 2 WA.Lsn, Com~mNrrAriEs oN TH LAW OF BEAL Pitor-
mn-v 145-67 (1947).
3O Veysey v. Monyama, 184 Cal. 802, 195 Pac. 662 (1921); 2 WAIsi, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 306.
11Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-m-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35
(1930); Palumbo v. Olympia Theatres, 276 Mass. 84, 176 N.E. 815 (1931).
12 For example, a disturbance of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises is suf-
ficient to constitute a constructive eviction. Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper
Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24 (1944); Sierad v. Lilly, 204 Cal. App. 2d 770, 22
Cal. Rptr. 580 (1962); Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit, 155 App. Div. 182, 139 N.Y.S.
1050 (1913).
'
3 While one tenant or a few tenants might be able to find housing in better
condition, a substantial number of the tenants living in substandard housing, if they
moved, would have no place to go.
14 U.S. Dm'v oF CoMmEcE, BunEu oF Tm CENsus, 1960 CENsus OF HOUSING,
1 STATEs & SMALL AREAs 46 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 CENsusI.15 Ibid. A standard metropolitan area is a heavily populated area, composed of the
central city and surrounding suburbs, determined by the existence of contiguous
dwellings, not political boundaries.
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were in a deteriorating or dilapidated condition.'0 Tenants occupied twice as
many of these substandard dwellings as did owners. 17 This indicates that the
problem is of great magnitude, and that tenants bear the brunt of substandard
housmg.' 8 The number of units classified as substandard is increasing as old
dwellings are not repaired and new ones are built defectively.19
California also is beset with problems of substandard housing. With over 5
million dwelling units in the state in 1960, 9.4 per cent were deteriorating or
dilapidated,20 and over one-half of these were tenant occupied. 21 In Los Angeles
and San Francisco, substandard housing occupied by tenants outnumbers such
premises occupied by owners in even greater proportions.22
The existing common law is inadequate to provide relief from the substandard
conditions which exist in California and other areas of the United States.23 When
a landlord fails to adequately maintain his premises, the substandard condition
10 5,044,150 of the 36,386,215 dwellings located in standard metropolitan areas
were deteriorating or dilapidated. Ibzd.
17 Ibid.
Is While the precise effects of living in substandard conditions cannot be measured,
there is a definite correlation between a substandard neighborhood and a high crime rate.
See San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, Jan. 1, 1967, p. 13, col. 8.19 See TEBBEL, ThE SLum MArams 48-49 (1963). See generally TEBSEL, supra
ThoiosoN, A PB.FACE TO Ur'BAx ECONoMiCS (1965).
20 In 1960 there were 5,465,870 dwelling units in the state; 585,540 of these
were deteriorating or dilapidated. 1960 CENSUS 5.
2 1 Tenants occupied 322,377 out of the 585,540 deteriorating or dilapidated
dwellings. Ibid.22 1n Los Angeles, out of 936,202 total units, 77,541 were substandard; of these,
only 16,392 were owner occupied, while 52,100 were tenant occupied (a ratio of
over 3 to 1). Id. at 67. In San Francisco, out of 310,552 total units, 27,785 were
substandard; of these only 3,569 were owner occupied, while 19,993 were tenant
occupied (a ratio of over 5 to 1). Id. at 70.
23 If substandard housing were eliminated there would not be retaliatory eviction,
as tenants would no longer have violations to report to the authorities. Present practices
are not eliminating substandard housing. Public housing lacks adequate funds to make
a significant difference in the general trend of housing conditions. Telephone Interview
With Fred S. Threefoot, Manager, Rental Office, San Francisco Housing Authority,
Oct. 1966. Strict code enforcement meets the objection that in many instances it would
be unjust to the property owner. Financing improvements is a major problem for the
owners; to provide adequate time to raise the necessary capital, San Francisco violators
are given eighteen months to comply with code requirements after discovery. Interview
With Mr. Robert Bullock, Inspector, Dep't of Public Health, Bureau of Sanitation
& Housing Inspection, San Francisco, California, Oct. 1966. Mr. Bullock indicated
that many times the Inspection Bureau itself is forced to evict tenants, when the land-
lord cannot or will not repair his premises. Owners of dwellings in the worst condition are
no longer able to evict a complaining tenant and replace him with another, unless they
repair the substandard conditions. While inspections were made only once a year in the
past, they are now made continuously in the case of flagrant violation of the building
codes. Large scale removal of substandard housing does not have any lasting effect, as
new slums spring up to take the place of old ones. See MiraSPA GH, HumAi, SiDE
OF UBAN RENEWAL 230-31 (1958); THOMI'soN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 296-98. In any
event, elimination of substandard housing will be a gradual process. It does not seem
justifiable to permit retaliatory eviction simply because the conditions fostering it may
someday disappear.
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may be corrected if the tenant is able to inform the authorities of that condition
without fear of retaliatory eviction. But the tenant who is faced with the threat
of retaliatory eviction is not likely to report substandard conditions to the
authorities. In this manner, the threat of retaliatory eviction may contribute to
substandard housing.
Other States Have Acted
Progressive jurisdictions, recognizing the problem, have taken affirmative
action. In New York, the Spiegel Law, 24 enacted in 1962, allows public welfare
officials to withhold rent where tenants who are welfare recipients live in housing
with conditions which are dangerous or detrimental to life or health. Realizing
the negative effect a retaliatory eviction would have on this statute, the legtsla-
ture amended the law in 1965 to provide for a stay of eviction.2 5 Now, when
rent is withheld because of substandard conditions, the landlord cannot regain
possession as long as deleterious conditions exist. Although this provision applies
only to tenants who are also welfare recipients, it seems indicative of the change
in the law necessary to improve substandard housing everywhere. 20
Massachusetts2 7 and Connecticut 28 have modified the landlord and tenant
relationship, by enacting statutes which are similar in nature. Taking notice of
the housing shortage, the Massachusetts legislature has given the courts the
discretionary power to stay a judgment and execution of eviction for a period of
up to nine months.29 This judicial power can be exercised only when the tenant
is not a wrongdoer, and when he has searched diligently but unsuccessfully for
similar housing in the same city.30 The tenant must comply with any terms the
24 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 997, effective July 1, 1962. The act states, in part:
"The legislature hereby finds and declares that certain evils and abuses exist which
have caused many tenants, who are welfare recipients, to suffer untold hardships,
deprivation of services and deterioration of housing facilities because certain landlords
have been exploiting such tenants by failing to make necessary repairs and by neglecting
to afford necessary services in violation of the laws of the state. " This statement
appears in the legislative history section of the codification; see N.Y. Soc. WErIxAiE LAW
§ 143-b (McKinney 1966).
25 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 997, effective July 1, 1962, as amended by N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1965, ch. 701, effective July 2, 1965, N.Y. Soc. WErwnmE LAw § 143-b(5)b
(McKinney 1966). Subsection (5)b of this amendment provides: "In any such action
or proceeding the plaintiff or landlord shall not be entitled to an order or judgment
awarding him possession of the premises or providing for removal of the tenant, or to a
money judgment against the teant, on the basis of non-payment of rent for any period
during which there was outstanding any violation of law relating to dangerous or
hazardous conditions or conditions detrimental to life or health."26 While the Spiegel Law avoids the problems of the vague doctrine of constructive
eviction, see notes 10-13 supra, by providing relief for a condition dangerous to life,
health or safety [N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 143-b(2) (McKinney 1966)], it has been
criticized because its rent-withholding provisions might prevent a poor property owner
from improvmg the premises [see Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding
Under New York's Spiegel Law, 15 BuFFALO L. REv. 572, 584-85 (1966)], especially if
the owner has no income except that which he collects from his tenants.
27M Ass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, §§ 9-13 (1959).
28 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-546 (Supp. 1964).
2 9 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, §§ 9-13 (1959).
30MAss. Gr. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 10 (1959).
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court may prescribe X Perhaps the most vital part of the Massachusetts law is
the statement that "any provision of a lease whereby a lessee or tenant waives
the benefits of any provision [for a stay of eviction] shall be deemed to be
against public policy and void."3 2 Thus, it appears that retaliatory eviction can
be effectively prevented for a brief period.
Illinois changed the common law in 1963 by expressly prohibiting retaliatory
eviction:
It is declared to be against the public policy of the State for a landlord to
terminate or refuse to renew a lease or tenancy of property used as a residence
on the ground that the tenant has complained to any governmental authority
of a bona fide violation of any applicable building code, health ordinance, or
similar regulation. Any provision in any lease, or any agreement or understandindg,
purporting to permit the landlord to terminate or refuse to renew a lease or
tenancy for such reason is void.33
While this statute would seem to effectively prevent retaliatory eviction, attorneys
in Illinois have found that as a practical matter it is often difficult to prove that
the reason for the eviction was retaliation 34
Although the attempts of these states to prevent retaliatory eviction is laud-
able, most of the statutes are subject to the criticism that they do not prohibit
ndirect retaliatory action by the landlord. There is no express restriction to
prevent the landlord from raising the tenant's rent in retaliation of the tenant's
complaint to the authorities.3 5 If the landlord has the power to raise the rent
above the tenant's ability to pay, without regard to the market rental value of the
premises, the landlord could claim non-payment of rent as his reason for
eviction. As a practical consideration, a landlord would favor a rent increase to
force his tenant to move rather than a formal action to effect the same result.3 6
It would seem that this practice as well as direct retaliatory eviction should be
prohibited.
Why Elimnate Retaliatory Eviction?
It seems unjust to permit the retaliatory eviction of a tenant who has aided
law enforcement, promoted public policy, and unproved health conditions. Re-
s1 MAss. GEm. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 10 (1959).8 2 MAss. Gm-. LAws AN. ch. 239, § 12 (1959).
33 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1965). In Illinois, out of 3,275,799 dwellings, 503,-
438 were substandard; of these, over one-half were tenant occupied in 1960. 1960
CENsus at 6. With less than 7% of the dwellings substandard, the Illinois legislature
thought it advantageous to prevent retaliatory eviction.84 Letter From Edward Flitton, student participant in the Conference on the
Landlord-Tenant Relationship at the University of Chicago Law School, Nov. 1966. At-
torneys at the conference noted the difficulty of proof. Edwards v. Habib did not solve
tis problem, as it merely gave the tenant a chance to prove that she was being evicted
in retaliation; no guidelines were drawn. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra.
85 The laws of New York are not completely subject to this criticism, as local
rent control (for cities over one million population) prevents this action by the land-
lord. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 21, as amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 318, as
amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 13.
86 Interview With Mr. Robert Bullock, supra note 23. Of course, improvements
in housing will justify some increase in rent as an amortized investment; this should not
be too difficult to distinguish from a retaliatory increase in rent.
NOTES
taliatory eviction should be allowed only if there are factors which outweigh the
policy in favor of encouraging the tenant to complain about substandard housing.
Indeed, landlords of slum properties often contend that the tenants cause the
delapidation in their buildings37 But this contention may be refuted by the
argument that the landlord's rental practices are the major cause of substandard
housing. 8 By permitting too many tenants to occupy a dwelling, the landlord
may increase his rental income. But this will probably lead to more wear and tear
on the building, which in turn will cause substandard conditions. If the land-
lord must repair the delapidation resulting from increased tenancy, his increased
profits will be diminished. Since most slumlords are interested in maximizing
profits, they do not make the necessary repairs, and thus housing conditions fall
below standard. However, if retaliatory eviction Is eliminated, tenants might
complain more often, necessitating more repairs. This would make overcrowding
less profitable for the landlord, as the increase of tenants would lead to a greater
cost of repairs. Thus, eliminate retaliatory eviction and it is probable that the
rental practices of the slumlord will change.
While there are possible disadvantages in prohibiting retaliatory eviction,
they are not sufficient to justify a continued sanction of the practice. For example,
tenants might harass the landlord with excessive complaints to the authorities.3 9
In such a situation, eviction should not be barred, as the tenant is not seeking
the enforcement of the law.
One authority suggests that "the long-run success or failure of rehabilitation
[of the slums] is inextricably tied up with the attitudes of the people living in
the neighborhoods to be renewed." 40 The people living in substandard housing
must believe that their efforts will be of some benefit, if they are to seek im-
provement of their environment. Yet if tenants are evicted when they complain
to the authorities, they are apt to feel that they are helpless, and complacently
accept their substandard housing. While it is true that the attitude of a landlord
is not likely to be improved when a tenant complains, once the landlord realizes
that he cannot evict the tenant in retaliation, he will be more likely to repair the
premises before a complaint is made. Without retaliatory eviction it is possible
that the relationship between landlord and tenant will be miproved, in the long
run. If retaliatory eviction is prevented, housing problems will not be solved.
But a step in the right direction will have been taken.
Status of the Law in Califorma
Califorma has the same problem of substandard housing as other jurisdictions
which have already attempted to prohibit retaliatory eviction.41 Yet the laws of
8 Simmons, supra note 26, at 591. Assuming that this is true, it should not relieve
the landlord of his duty to keep his premises in standard condition, as other tenants in
the building who have not caused the deleterious conditions should not be made to
suffer. Ibid.
88 See THOMFSOx, supra note 19, at 296-98.
39 Interview With Mr. Robert Bullock, supra note 23. Mr. Bullock indicated that
even now, tenants sometimes exceed the bounds of reasonableness in their demands.
4 0 MmLSiAuGH, HUMAN SmIE or URBAN Rz xwAL. 230 (1958).
41 For one example, compare note 33 supra with the statistics in notes 20-22
supra and accompanying text.
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California are seemingly inadequate to afford the tenant relief from substandard
housing and totally inadequate to prevent retaliatory eviction.
When a tenant rents from month to month, at will, or at sufferance, the land-
lord in order to end the tenancy must provide written notice to remove from the
premises within not less than thirty days. 48 If the tenant does not move, the
landlord may bring summary proceedings for possession4 4 under the unlawful
detainer statute.45 As it is a summary proceeding for possession, neither a cross-
complaint nor a counterclaim may be properly filed by the defending tenant.48
42 The California legislature of 1872 recognized the tenant's need for relief from
substandard housing and attempted to fill that need by enacting Civil Code §§ 1941 and
1942. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1941 provides: "The lessor of a building intended for the oc-
cupation of human beings must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it
into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof,
which render it untenantable, except such as are [caused by the tenant's failure to
exercise reasonable care]." Section 1942 states: "If within a reasonable time after
notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so,
the lessee may repair the same humself, where the cost of such repairs do not require
an expenditure greater than one month's rent of the premises, and deduct the expenses
of such repairs from the rent, or the lessee may vacate the premises, m which case he
shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of other conditions."
The courts have held that when there is an express waiver of any obligation of
the landlord to repair, no covenant to repair may be implied against the owner. Bakers-
field Laundry Ass'n v. Rubm, 131 Cal. App. 2d 862, 280 P.2d 921 (App. Dep't, Super.
Ct., Kern 1955). Even if the parties do not agree to waive the provisions in the code,
the court may find that the tenant has mpliedly waived his rights, by not seeking en-
forcement of the code provisions. If the landlord does not repair, and the tenant neither
applies one month's rent for such repairs nor moves, he has inpliedly waived the provi-
sions. Moroney v. Hellings, 110 Cal. 219, 42 Pac. 560 (1895). At best, the legislative
modifications of the common law in 1872 were of little real benefit to the tenant of sub-
standard housing.
More recently, Califorma has attempted to improve the position of a limited
number of tenants living in substandard housing. The rules of the California Department
of Social Welfare, governing aged, totally disabled, or blind welfare recipients states
that when a member of this class of persons lives in substandard housing, that portion
of his monthly check which is to be used for rent is lowered to twenty-one dollars a
month until the conditions are corrected or the tenant moves. Cal. State Dep't of Social
Welfare, Old Age Security-Manual of Policies and Procedures, § A-202.05 (1964).
This has not worked well and in many instances has created a great hardship for the
welfare recipient tenant. In practice, the rent allowance is restored to normal as soon
as the landlord applies for a building permit; as it is usually eighteen months before the
work is completed, the tenant continues to live in substandard housing for that period.
Even if the landlord does not repair, he often collects the full amount of the rent from
that portion of the welfare recipient tenant's check that is intended for food. Interview
With Mrs. Else Reisner, Housing Co-ordinator of Adult Programs, City and County of
San Francisco, Oct. 7, 1966.
43 CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.
44 CAL. CIV. CODE § 792 (summary possession statute). When the tenancy is
ended, the tenant must surrender the premises. Coburn v. Goodall, 72 Cal. 498, 14 Pac.
190 (1887).
45 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc, § 1161.
46 A tenant cannot enter a cross complaint that he entered the lease under fraud,
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There are a few exceptions to the summary nature of the unlawful detainer
statute.47 Perhaps the most important exception is found in the recent case of
Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchnson,48 where the alleged denial of a constitu-
tional right was held to be a proper ground for a full hearing before the court.49
A Negro tenant with a month to month lease was served with notice to quit, but
he refused to move. The landlord brought an action for possession under the un-
lawful detainer statute, and the court held that the alleged constitutional defense
(denial of equal protection) could be entered against the summary suit for
possession.50 The court decided that a summary judgment of eviction based on
grounds of race alone would violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and the general principles of equity.51 "Certainly the interest in
preserving the summary nature of an action cannot outweigh the interest of doing
substantial justice." 2
With the reasoning in the Abstract decision that the denial of a constitutional
right is a proper defense in a summary proceeding for possession, it is to be hoped
that the California courts will adopt the reasoning in the Habib case53 and con-
strue retaliatory eviction as an infringment of constitutional rights.54 But even if
Abstract and Habib are interpreted together to provide a defense to retaliatory
eviction, it would apparently be a defense only;5 5 that may not be sufficient. There
or deny the landlord's title in a suit for unlawful detainer. Knowles v. Robinson, 60 Cal.
2d 620, 36 Cal. Rptr. 33, 387 P.2d 833 (1963).
47 There is a statutory provision for discretionary relief from forfeiture of a lease,
where hardship would otherwise result. CAL. CODE Cirv. Pnoc. § 1179. Equity has al-
lowed a lessee to prove the existence of an oral lease to prevent a forfeiture. Schubert
v. Lowe, 193 Cal. 291, 223 Pac. 550 (1924). And equity will allow oral proof of an
agreement that a more formal lease was contemplated, to prevent a forfeiture. Rishwain
v. Smith, 77 Cal. App. 2d 524, 175 P.2d 555 (1947). But relief from forfeiture has been
demed where the tenant withheld rent due to the landlord's failure to make repairs.
Cambridge v. Webb, 109 Cal. App. 2d 936, 244 P.2d 505 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct,
San Francisco 1952). Since a lease without a provision for duration is not a sufficient
estate to constitute a forfeiture if the tenant is evicted, it seems there is no equitable
relief for the majority of tenants living m substandard housing. See City of Marysville
v. Poole, 76 Cal. App. 478, 245 Pac. 248 (1926) (forfeiture of growing crops not
sufficient for equitable action).
48204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962).
49 "The court has the power to look beyond the allegations of the complaint in an
unlawful detainer proceeding and to inquire into the constitutional issue [of equal pro-
tection] placed before it by the affirnative defenses of the action." Id. at 247,
22 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
5o Ibtd. Since the suit for unlawful detainer was brought in a state court, the
necessary state action was involved in the demal of equal protection. Id. at 245-46, 22
Cal. Rptr. at 311.
5l Id. at 249, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
52 Ibid.
53 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
54 Ibid.
r5 When a Negro sought an njunction to restrain his landlord from evicting him
when the landlord gave notice to quit solely on the grounds of race, he was granted no
relief. The court noted that as the state was not a party to the wrongdoing, there was
no denil of the equal protection of the laws. Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 689, 415 P.2d 33 (1966).
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may be instances where a right of action, in the form of an injunction, would be
the more desirable remedy.5 6
Guidelines for California
If California is to maintain its leadership in the law, retaliatory eviction should
be prohibited. An exception to the summary nature of an action for possession,
allowing the tenant to allege retaliatory eviction as a defense, would be desirable.
Such an exception, however, should extend only to the question of the retaliatory
motive.57 To aid the proof of a retaliatory motive,58 it would also be desirable
to permit a presumption of retaliatory eviction when the tenant complains to the
authorities, and the landlord seeks eviction within a definite period thereafter.59
51 For example, when the landlord refuses to rent to the tenant solely because he
thinks the tenant will report violations to the authorities, a situation analogous to Hill
v. Miller, supra note 55, an injunction would be a more adequate remedy for the
tenant. A discussion of the injunctive relief is beyond the scope of this paper and is
mentioned only to indicate another possible method of defeating a retaliatory motive.
57 A summary proceeding can be heard and decided quickly, with little difficulty;
a defense would undoubtably extend the time required m court. If the summary nature
of the action is to be preserved, defenses less important than retaliatory eviction should
not be allowed.
At present, CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1179a requires that the courts give precedence
to actions for the recovery of real property in order to obtain a rapid hearing and
determination. Other exceptions to the summary nature of the proceedings for pos-
session indicate that a full hearing in a limited area of possessory actions would not
greatly disrupt present procedure. A constitutional defense may be asserted, Abstract
Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962) and
an equitable defense may be heard where forfeiture of an estate in land is involved,
Schubert v. Lowe, 193 Cal. 291, 223 Pac. 550 (1924); Bishwain v. Smith, 77 Cal. App.
2d 524, 175 P.2d 55 (1947). Once landlords realize that retaliatory eviction is not pos-
sible, it is probable that they would institute fewer suits for eviction. Thus, allowing
a defense against retaliatory eviction should not overburden the courts.
If experience were to prove that the increased work would be too great a burden
on the courts, it might be desirable to create a new branch of the municipal court to
hear and determine landlord-tenant cases exclusively. This has been suggested by Mrs.
Else Reisner, supra note 55, and has been done an the District of Columbia. The dis-
senting opinion of Judge Danaher n Edwards v. Habib, 366 F.2d 628, 631-32 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) indicates that this system has been very successful.
Such a specialized court would not only relieve the regular courts of some of their
presently excessive workloads but would probably increase the rapidity of possessory
actions, since there would be no precedence of other suits as CAL. Civ. CoDE PRoc.
§ 1179a presently requires.5 8 For a discussion of methods to overcome the difficulites of proof see Schoshinski,
Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966). But see
Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigents Tenant: Two Approaches, 54 CALw. L.
REv. 670, 682 (1966) (proof thought to be almost impossible).
59 A definite period, established by the legislature, would seem to be more desirable
than a reasonable time determined by the courts. If the tenant has to prove that the
landlord's eviction proceeding reasonably (i.e., within a period that would logically
support the inference of retaliation under all the circumstances) followed the complaint,
the proof required of the tenant would be of the same nature as that which the presump-
tion was designed to eliminate, thus diminishing the effect of the presumption.
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